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Abstract 
Through an in-depth ethnographic case study, we explore water management practices within 
the Jiroft County province in Iran and discuss the applicability of indigenous knowledge of 
locally-based sustainable water management initiatives to the resource governance challenges 
of arid and drought-prone regions across the world. The relationship between community social 
structure, indigenous knowledge, water management technologies and practices, and their 
collective role in sustainable natural resource governance in the face of anthropogenic climate 
change are explored through qualitative analysis. From participant observational and interview 
data (n=32), we find that historically dependent community roles create a social contract that 
governs water sharing and distribution. Defined social roles and cultural conventions establish 
linked hierarchies of water ownership, profit-sharing and social responsibility; collectively 
they provide a flexible and equitable system of role-sharing, social benefit distribution, socio-
ecological resilience and adaptive capacity in the face of climate change-induced drought. We 
conclude that the combination of a hierarchical land ownership-based water distribution 
mechanism combined with what we term “bilateral compensatory mutual assistance” for the 
lowest profit agricultural water users, provides a model of spontaneous common pool resource 
management that fosters community drought resilience. We use this case to proffer 
recommendations for adapting other centralized, grey infrastructure and regulatory models of 
water management based upon lessons learned from this spontaneous adaptive management 
model shown in this case. 
 




It is widely accepted that freshwater ecosystems face multiple and severe threats – they remain 
amongst the world’s most imperiled ecosystems (Jackson, Finn, and Scheepers 2014). 
Freshwater ecosystems underpin global food production from both commercial and subsistence 
fisheries, aquaculture, crop production and pastoral grazing (Dixon et al. 2001, Abbasi et al. 
2016, Ghoochani et al. 2018). Both crop and animal food production systems are therefore 
stressed when agricultural water supplies are scarce (Hoekstra et al. 2012, Parraguez-Vergara 
et al. 2018, Azadi et al. 2015). Water scarcity mars both indigenous and non-indigenous 
agricultural communities, although, the former commonly bear the greatest burdens. Many 
indigenous collectivities rely upon aquatic resources for their livelihoods, and it is these groups 
that are most vulnerable to the impact of long-term water shortages as a result of changing 
precipitation patterns under climate change, and from water resource extraction and utilization 
projects such as reservoirs and dams (Jackson, Finn, and Scheepers 2014, Stoeckl et al. 2013, 
Eskandari et al. 2016).  
 
Global water shortages are caused by both exogenous environmental factors, such as 
temperature change, changes in dust levels, pollution and precipitation patterns (Schewe et al. 
2014), and endogenous human activities including poor land and water use policy and 
planning, and long-term resource mismanagement (von der Porten 2013, Ghanian et al. 2020). 
In response, over the past two decades there has been a shift in water resource management 
away from a centralized, top-down “command and control” paradigm towards a political-
ecological perspective that links the hydrological cycle at local, regional and global levels with 
processes of social, political, economic, and cultural power (Swyngedouw and Swyngedouw 
2004). Water then becomes a combined physical and social process commonly referred to as a 
hydro-social cycle. Embedding this thinking within water management requires decentralized 
processes of social decision-making and appropriate structures and procedures to support 
public participation in water management under conditions of long-term climate adaptation 
planning, population growth and changes to agricultural practices (Jackson 2018, Mostert 
2003, Tan et al. 2010, Douthwaite et al. 2009, Sanz et al. 2019, Nasrabadi and Shamsai 2014, 
Srdjevic and Srdjevic 2013).  
 
Hydro-social paradigmatic thinking emphasizes the importance of facilitating local initiatives 
in water management - defined as informal or semi-formal organizations, or collective action 
by groups. Water management under the hydro-social paradigm has undergone a ‘procedural 
turn’ (Schmidt 2014) - an orientation that has ‘favored the design of management institutions 
that allow for multiple viewpoints, multiple objectives and the capacity to reflexively respond 
to surprise and uncertainty’ (ibid.). Procedural justice such that ‘fair procedures will produce 
fair outcomes’ (Schmidt 2014), is underpinned by the expectation that decision-making will 
‘not intrinsically favor the beliefs – the substantive goods – of any particular group’ (ibid.). 
Fair water management will therefore foster shared visions, objectives and norms amongst 
communities of water users and practitioners (Jackson 2018, Savari, Damaneh, and Damaneh 
2020), and be attentive to the cultural capacities and long-term ecological potential within local 
initiatives in a way that is sustainable under conditions of long-term climatic change. 
Integrating diverse types and sources of knowledge to achieve this aim is of critical importance 
(Rathwell, Armitage, and Berkes 2015, Bohensky and Maru 2011, Mantyka-Pringle et al. 2017, 
Suresh, Jha, and Pal 2018), and there is a growing interest among scientific, governmental and 
non-governmental institutions in harnessing both the social capacity of agricultural 
communities and their respective indigenous knowledges (hereafter IK) within contemporary 
natural resource management (NRM) practices (Woodward et al. 2012, Von Der Porten 2012, 
2013). Bottom-up hydro-social water management is posited as both a means to alleviate 
environmental injustice faced by these groups, and to substantively improve the adaptive 
capacity of existing NRM approaches through processes of social learning (Berkes 2009, 
Berkes, Colding, and Folke 2000, McDonnell 2008). In short, there is increasing recognition 
within academic and policy circles that modern, globally connected consumer societies can 
learn from peoples that have effectively managed their natural resources sustainably over many 
centuries, through an understanding of social roles and water management norms, and the 
application of IK around water conservation practices (DeWalt 1994, Dove 2006, Bicker, 
Pottier, and Sillitoe 2003, Rawluk and Saunders 2019).  
 
Indigenous Knowledge (IK) 
 
With a shift towards a hydro-social paradigm of water management there is recognition that 
local needs, aspirations and knowledge in relation to the use and management of water 
resources are pivotal for effective and sustainable long-term governance (Nguyen and Ross 
2017, Eskandari-Damaneh et al. 2020). There is no single definition of indigenous knowledge 
(IK), though it is generally understood as the collective skills, understanding and philosophies 
of societies that have a long history of occupation and observation in interacting with the 
natural environment (Fraser et al. 2006, Woodward et al. 2012). IK is commonly interwoven 
with local religious beliefs, customs, folklore, and land-use practices, and it plays an important 
role not only in sustainable NRM under conditions of rapid and sustained environmental 
change, but also in sustaining traditional culture and livelihoods (Juanwen, Quanxin, and 
Jinlong 2012, Maragia 2005, Chao and Hsu 2011). The issue of indigenous water management 
has gained considerable international research interest, with case studies across a range of 
communities in the Global North – including Australia, (Ayre and Mackenzie 2013), the United 
States (Wilson 2014) and Canada (Wilson and Inkster 2018), and the Global South – including 
notable cases in Ethiopia (Behailu, Pietilä, and Katko 2016), Eritrea (Mehari, Schultz, and 
Depeweg 2005), and  Nepal (Gautam, Thapa, and Prajapati 2018) showing the role that 
indigenous knowledge plays in developing sustainable water management strategies that allow 
fair distribution of water resources contingent upon the participation of indigenous people in 
planning processes. 
 
IK is defined as being in some sense “local”- it is a relational place-based knowledge that 
informs communities’ day-to-day decision-making, and encompasses language, resource use 
and management, systems of classification (including biota and biophysical conditions), social 
interactions, and cultural and spiritual practices (Ford et al. 2016, Mackey and Claudie 2015, 
Nalau et al. 2018). Indeed, human interactions with water bodies and aquatic ecosystems are 
often a source of cultural inspiration that have a religious or spiritual foundation (Jackson, Finn, 
and Scheepers 2014). Collectively, IK forms a stock of social, human and cultural capital which 
embodies complex systems of beliefs, values, methods, tools and knowledge (Roux et al. 
2006). IK systems contain detailed representations of the forces that have shaped the diversity 
and conditions of past and current environments (Ens et al. 2015), and are fundamentally 
social-ecological knowledge systems that enable human use of natural resources within 
existing limitations and opportunities (Yuan et al. 2014). This means that IK structures the 
relationship between societies and natural ecosystems as well as the association of communities 
with themselves (Berkes, Colding, and Folke 2000, Pei and Huai 2007). IK structures 
indigenous institutions1, in the sense of systems of rules, norms and management frameworks. 
IK (commonly) treats humans and nature as inherently inter-related and mutually dependent, 
and that respect for this dialectic is necessary to maintain long-term ecosystemic and livelihood 
sustainability (Lead et al. 2010, Berkes and Folke 1998, Colding, Folke, and Elmqvist 2003). 
IK then structures the rules, norms and institutions that regulate human use of ecosystems such 
that natural resources continue to remain viable into the future (Leach, Mearns, and Scoones 
1999, Berkes and Folke 1998).  
 
IK has diverse merits in water management, irrigation system management (Poudel and 
Sharma 2012, Parajuli 2013), sustainable construction practices (Gautam et al. 2016) and 
climate adaptation (Nkomwa et al. 2014, Codjoe, Owusu, and Burkett 2014). Learning from 
 
1 indigenous institutions are "those institutions that have emerged in a particular situation or that are practiced or 
constituted by people who have had a degree continuity of living in, and using resource of an area.”(Shisanya 
2017, Aggarwal 2008) 
IK can  improve the capacity to develop and implement water management plans in areas of 
inter-seasonal variation. It can also enhance understanding of river ecology and water-
dependent ecosystems, of surface and groundwater interactions, efficient supply of high quality 
water resources to remote communities, and water accounting practices under stressed 
conditions (Baul and McDonald 2014, Mantyka-Pringle et al. 2017, Rivera-Ferre et al. 2016, 
Robinson et al. 2016, Shemsanga et al. 2018, Baul and McDonald 2015, Chaudhry, Ahmed, 
and Farooq 2014). IK in water management practices has been shown to have a number of 
environmental sustainability benefits (Ayre and Mackenzie 2013, David and Ploeger 2014, 
Jackson et al. 2012), as well as economic and energy efficiency measures (Sillitoe 1998, Lall 
1993). However, the tripartite challenges of land use pressures to meet food security aims, the 
centralisation of grey infrastructure approaches to water management for industrial and 
agricultural use, and the water stress pressures of climate change, create constant and growing 
pressures on water resources. The incorporation of IK-based learning into centralized, grey 
infrastructure-dominated water management systems therefore has tangible sustainable 
development benefits, and this paper aims to explore this policy and practice gap through 
lessons gained from the implementation of IK within a critical Iranian case study. We then 
discuss how the learning from this local initiative can be applied to water management in 
climate change-induced arid and drought-stricken regions across the world.  
 
Specifically, we examine the following research questions: 
 
1. What are the patterns of social organization and beneficiaries’ relationship pattern with 
the case study region? 
2. What are the indigenous knowledge systems of water circulation practice and how is 
division of the resource governed? 
3. What are the practical sharing mechanisms for hydro-social-system maintenance (e.g. 
the dredging of streams and pools)? 
4. What are the participatory features of local water management? Who is involved and 
how? 
5. What cultural beliefs underpin residents’ perceptions and practices of natural resource 
management? 
 
We explore these questions through a participatory and ethnographic case study in the Roozkin 
village in Jiroft County in Iran. 
 
Case study characteristics 
The combination of Iran’s arid/semi-arid climate and high levels of industrial, agricultural and 
consumer water use create a ‘perfect storm’ of water insecurity, thus hydro-social management 
is an essential focus of policy-making, system design and socio-environmental research. 
Mesbahzadeh et al. (2019) argue, considerable evidence for contemporary climate change in 
the arid regions of Iran, with a resultant water crisis emerging. Water scarcity in Iran has 
intensified in recent decades under conditions of climate change (Sayari et al. 2013) and 
population growth (Madani 2014). The country is subject to severe and intensifying droughts 
which have caused economic, social and human losses in all sectors (Foltz 2002, Hayati, 
Yazdanpanah, and Karbalaee 2010, Ghoochani et al. 2017). In this empirical study, we employ 
a critical case study approach (Flyvbjerg 2006) to one region affected by changes to regional 
climate, and the interaction between these broader environmental factors and the social 
organization processes of water management based upon indigenous knowledge (IK) practices. 
The case study is based in Sarduye in the Jiroft county located in Kerman province (population 
36,379 based upon recent census data (2016)). The geographic location of the case study region 
is shown in Figure 1. This part of the province is composed of many small villages. The villages 
collectively manage agricultural water with the same hydro-social system, as shown in the 
bottom-right hand corner of figure 1. All villages within the basin rely upon rivers as the 
agricultural water resource, and we selected the Roozkin village in this county as an exemplar 
case within the region. River water is shared among other neighbouring villages, though the 
qanat2 water belongs exclusively to Roozkin village. Roozkin village was selected as it has a 
special boundary management arrangement and is an illustrative example of local place-based 
initiatives and indigenous knowledge in irrigation water management. The local economy is 
primarily agricultural (nuts, cherries, apricots, apples, peaches and almonds). 
 
Fig 1: Geographical location of case study 
From a climate and development perspective, Roozkin is significant, due to growing evidence 
of climatic change at the regional level (Aboubakri et al. 2020, Khanjani and Bahrampour 
2013, Mesbahzadeh et al. 2019, Eskandari Damaneh et al. 2019). Recent data gathered from 
the nearest synoptic automatic weather station to the study area (Miandeh Jiroft Station: 57º 
24’ 00”N, 28º 35’ 00”E, Altitude: 639m) show decreasing levels of precipitation during the 
years 2006-2020, with rainfall in the last four years less than the 3-year moving average of the 
region, as shown in Figure 2. As figure 3 also shows, there is also an increasing temperature 
trend in this region during the same period. Accordingly, the reduction of water resources due 
 
2 Whereby a qanat is a type of underground aqueduct - a gently sloping underground channel to transport water 
from a well or aquifer to the surface that brings water from a deep well with a series of vertical access shafts.  
to reduced rainfall inflows and increased evaporation of surface water is indicative of climate-
induced water stress. How to manage ever-scarcer water resources requires hydro-social 
management – linking changes in resource availability with stakeholder knowledge and 
experience in handling changes in environmental conditions over time. Local initiatives 
involving traditional methods of water scarcity-adaptive measures are a strategic research and 
planning priority for the Iranian Government, and key lessons from local Iranian experience 
are relevant to other semi-arid and arid environments (Mesgaran and Azadi 2018, Khalkheili 
and Zamani 2009, Balali, Keulartz, and Korthals 2009).  
 
 
Fig 2. Regional precipitation changes 2006-2020 
 






































The empirical research employed ethnographic research methods familiar to this type of 
indigenous knowledge study (Sillitoe 1998); through participant observation over a 25-day 
period and in-depth interviews with local participants (n=32). Researchers used field surveys 
involving direct observation and participation to outline the culture, lifestyle and organization 
of social groups (Gupta and Ferguson 1997, Iphofen 2013, Reeves et al. 2013). Observation 
methods allow an understanding of the spatial and temporal context of indigenous knowledge 
to sustainable water management, and the semi-structured interviews with Roozkin villagers 
were employed to harness individual perspectives on water management practice. Participants 
were selected to create a nominally stratified sample across the social roles of villagers. All 
interviews were face-to-face, as appropriate to social research situations where literacy proves 
a barrier to community participation (Phellas, Bloch, and Seale 2011); and utterances are 
translated into English. Field guides and interview protocols were designed to explore the 
practices and reflections of participants on water resource sources, practices, beliefs and 
cultures and hence to derive an understanding of indigenous knowledge cultures and practices. 
Qualitative and observational data were subject to a narrative analysis (Mitchell and Egudo 
2003) – a social constructionist approach that emphasizes the stories that participants create 
and communicate. The analysis involves inquiry into how individuals represent themselves, 
their social status and collective knowledge, and how this reflects upon their own identity and 
how this is constructed within and amongst the community network. The results are then 
validated by sharing the analysis with the participants themselves to check for consistency 
between participant expression in the interviews and the reported findings.  
 
Findings 
Social organization of agricultural production and beneficiaries’ relationship pattern 
The purpose of this section is to reveal the social structure within the agricultural community 
and identify the pattern of relationships between them. Roozkin has a unique social-
organizational structure based upon villagers’ respective social roles. Figure  4 shows the basic 
social structure of the “Arbab-Raayat” hierarchy of this village, illustrating the different social 
roles from the top down i.e. “Khan3”, “Mobasher4”, “Kadkhoda5”, “Arbab6”, and “Zaeim7”. 
After Iranian land reform in 1964 this system continued in Sarduyeh with some modification. 
In the recent framework, “Khan” and “Mobasher” disappeared (the white section in Figure 4).  
 
3 Khan, (nickname), means “boss” 
4 Mobasher, (nickname), means “authorized people” 
5 Kadkhoda, (nickname), means the “leader” or “head” of a village 
6 Arbab, (nickname), means "master" and "landlord" 
7 Zaeim, (nickname), means “labor” 
 
Fig 4: The relationship between social roles in Arbab-Raayat hierarchy in Roozkin village 
 
In this framework, the Kadkhoda is, as one participant articulated:  
A person who has more agricultural land than other people in the village and this is 
usually hereditary.  
Based on interviews with respondents, it was found that the Kadkhoda is responsible for 
supervising certain tasks such as the qanats, streams, pool dredging, resolving the struggles 
between Arbabs and Zaeims that are lower down the social hierarchy. It is noted that the social 
position of the Kadkhoda didn’t disappear following national land reform but the strength of 
his (an exclusively male role) ties with lower ranks diminished. Regarding the repetition of the 
Arbab’s name among the discourses of the respondents, we asked them to define the Arbab for 
us, almost all respondents provided a definition as follows:  
Arbab was a person who possessed some farm-lands and gardens in one or more 
villages. They settled in Sarduyeh during summer and in Jiroft plain in winter.  
The Arbab’s social role is thus seasonally-affected, as out-migration from the community 
during the winter months is reflective of the need to diversify income livelihood strategy in 
line with growing seasons, given their relatively lower social and land-owning status within 
the hierarchy.  
The Zaeim is referred to as a person who is more active than the Arbab in the village and has 
kinship ties with others in his own group. Generally, the eldest son was the Zaeim of his family. 
The Zaeim was nominated by other villagers (usually brothers and sisters in a family) for 
irrigation, picking fruit, pruning, fertilizing, and other agricultural operations of Sarduyeh 
municipality in exchange for a wage (defined as a cut of total production). Regarding his 
remuneration, one of the respondents stated that:  
The amount of product to be given to this person was defined by local customs and 
mutual consent. It usually amounts to one third of harvested products.  
Families attempted to employ reliable, compassionate relatives for this job. Usually the 
nominated individual would have a low income. Bearing in mind the above-mentioned criteria, 
each family can choose its Zaeim from other groups. It is notable that group classifications are 
not permanent, rather the contract between Zaeim and Arbab is extended or repealed on an 
annual basis – thus social consent to maintaining the system of resource sharing rules is 
important to the process of maintaining social status and remuneration from agricultural 
resources. 
Traditionally, residents paid due attention to water resource management and devised a 
permanent division for it, in which the share apportioned to government, bureaucracies, and 
local people was precisely specified. In Iran the government is the responsible of water 
management and sale of irrigation water to citizens within a systematic regional water 
management plan. Therefore, it is this external allocation of water that is redistributed amongst 
the community, and interactions between Roozkin and surrounding villages take place within 
this broader national-scale institutional framework.  
Water circulation and water division of village and farmer’s assisting in common 
management of water 
The distribution systems for water among farmers is deeply significant to the structures of 
social organization. The water circulation is measured temporally. In the Roozkin village water 
sharing and circulation is based upon a 12-day cycle, and within this, the water rights of farmers 
differ on the basis of their respective land share. This system of time-limited water circulation 
is locally known as Demn. Water circulation between the end and beginning of the next 12-day 
period is also called Demn. Regarding the timing of Demn, one respondent stated:  
In each year, Demn starts on 5th May for water. Farmers in many villages store 
aqueducts’ water inside the pool.  
The Roozkin’s lands are divided into six Dang formed on a base unit of Habe (the 6 Dang in 
the village are formed from 96 Habe). The Habe is the main division unit of the property and 
hence equates also to apportioned water in the village. The Habe is equal to 3 hours of water 
usage and it is stable across a daily time scale, i.e. every 24 hours of the day, it consists of 8 
Habe and the allocated time is related to that Habe regardless of the time of day. If there is only 
one owner of all 6 Dang in a village, then all water will go to him. However, if there are multiple 
owners, then according to Habe (the property ownership) the water rights will be apportioned 
into smaller Dang. This is based upon the principle that each 1 Dang consists of 16 Habe of 
village property and equates to 48 hours water use. 
In Roozkin village each half of Dang consists of 8 Habe and 24 hours’ water use is calculated. 
Each 4 Habe is called Tapsouch, equating to 12 hours. The next smaller unit after Tapsouch is 
Qiah that is ¼ Habe and water division is done in this way too. The smallest unit of water 
division and also land division is called Shahi, in this way the agricultural division unit is in its 
smallest number that each 3 Shahi is ¼ Habe or Qiah, 1 Shahi is 7 minutes and in the local 
dialect this is called “Dahan-tar-kon”. 
 
Water orbit and sharing mechanisms for dredging streams and pools 
The mechanism of water division across the social hierarchy is not only linked to social status 
and land ownership but also to shared labour practices. The type of agricultural product grown, 
and the need for dredging of streams and pools are particularly important in defining the water 
orbit, i.e. frequency of irrigation. 
In describing the water orbit of different products one respondent stated: 
Irrigation of various agricultural crops (for example: Wheat, Barley, Lentil, Chickpea 
and so on) starts prior to April, but different fruit gardens’ irrigation is done at different 
times. For example, apricot, cherry, pear, and apple garden irrigation starts in early 
May and it is repeated every six days. 
Since at the early May, Qanats are replete with water and trees don’t need much water, and so 
systematic irrigation is not applied. As the season progresses and stored water is depleted, the 
water division system is put into practice. Since mid-May, the Demn system is implemented 
for water resource management and farmers store Qanat’s water inside the pool. In response to 
the question of how pools are designed in the countryside, one respondent stated: 
Farmers in this area, due to the lack of rainfall and in accordance with the available 
materials in the area, have designed pools that can collect water from the aqueducts 
within to irrigate the fruit gardens and other products.  
The period of time that water is stored inside the pool is specified by the Arbab’s Habe. For 
example, if a farmer owns one Taspouch, it means he can store water in his pool only for 12 
hours in a 12-day cycle (Demn). Prior to Demn system implementation, farmers dredge 
waterways and pools at the lower side of the Qanat so as to reduce water waste on the way 
from the pool to the farm.  
We argue that the common pool resource sharing mechanism is institutionalized between 
farmers for this process. This mechanism obliges each owner to participate in a dredging 
process proportionate to his share of farm-land and Habe. Initially, the whole-pool length is 
divided based on Sten – the length of a spade-handle equal to 1.5 meters (needless to say, pool 
volume varies based on qanat’s water flow rate). Then, the number of Sten is divided within 6 
Dangs or 96 Habe). If a pool is 6 Sten long, each Arbab of 1 Dang is then obliged to dredge 1 
Sten. Since pools are wider at the point ending to the Qanat’s outlet, final Stens are dredged 
collectively. The specific volume specified for each person to be dredged is termed Gerve. 
Gerving time is usually done before Demn is specified. If one violates Gerve rules, the 
punishment is to then subsequently be deprived of water. This happens rarely, in part because 
the risk of rule-breaking means total exclusion from the water resource. This proportional 
punitive system incentivizes all villagers to commit to maintaining and obeying local water 
management customs.  
 
Indigenous Knowledge and participatory water management 
The systems of hierarchical social organisation, indigenous knowledge in storage, dredging, 
irrigation and agricultural labour division collectively form a participatory, hydro-social water 
management system. Within this are questions of fair access to water, and corresponding water 
rights. In practice, fair access is based upon local engineering solutions to water distribution. 
In particular, earthen ponds are traditional structures constructed for dividing water so as to 
guarantee fair water access rights. They are built at the lower side of the Qanat and are based 
on its water flow rate. Traditionally, they were constructed out of clay but are now more 
commonly made of stone and cement. The structure enables Qanat water management when 
there is low or high rainfall. The pool is usually overlooking farm-lands so that water can flow 
toward and cover them. The pool’s height differs based upon the Qanat’s water flow rate, 
though this will usually not exceed 1.5 meters and its thickness must enable 24-hour water 
storage without being degraded or destroyed by the water flow. The outlet is made from locally-
cut Durable Mountain stone called Mazo in the local dialect8. The usually green stone is 
exfoliated, and a hole is made at the middle of the stone. The size of the hole depends on the 
qanat’s water flow rate and the volume of the pool. Mazo which is situated at the pool’s outlet 
is plugged with a wooden stick and some pieces of cloth at Demn time. Some soil is also poured 
over it so that water will not leak through the hole. The wooden stick is called Lapoo by local 
people. As the Lapoo is pulled out, the poured soil is easily washed away under water pressure 
from the pool. If soft soil is not used, the Mazo hole may be clogged and the farmer will not be 
able to utilize the pool’s water at an appropriate time. Every year that Gerozani (a local term 
meaning ‘dredging’) is done, its extra load will be left on the walls and fortify them and 
increase their height. At the pool’s center, over the Mazo stone, a type of runway is devised. 
When the pool is full, extra water will overflow from this runway in order to reduce pressure 
on the pool’s wall. The design of this structure is both a local engineering initiative for safe 
water storage and distribution, but also a mechanism to control fair access under conditions of 
water resource variability.  
Local customs and Water Management 
Of particular relevance within an indigenous knowledge-based system of water management 
are the local customs that shape social practices. In response to the question of how the 
Gerozani (dredging) is monitored, one of the respondents stated:  
“During Gerozani of streams and pools, the Kadkhoda supervises the process of 
dredging. He must confirm that it was done correctly. If he discerns that dredging was 
not done correctly, villagers are obliged to repeat the process. If villagers are not able 
to do so, the Kadkhoda will recruit some workers from other villages and pay their 
wage according to local customs.” 
Similarly, another participant stated that: 
“The streams are divided according to the amount of people's lands and everyone is 
responsible for cleaning up their own parts before starting the irrigation. They believed 
that the stream should be clean like a Palm (human hand) otherwise water is wasted”.  
The dredging of village Qanats is performed annually. Without maintenance the Qanat roof 
may collapse in winter due to snowfall and then the water flow will be blocked. If there is a 
well-digger in the village, he will undertake maintenance. Villagers call this well-digger 
Kahkin. The Kadkhoda collects payments from all Arbabs to pay the Kahkin’s wage. Each 
Arbab pays a specific amount proportionate to his properties. It is customary to pay the 
Kahkin’s wage once the qanats’ dredging ends. If there is no Kahkin in the village, it will be 
borrowed from other villages and he will earn his wage upon completion of the task. The 
Kahkin works under the supervision of Arbabs and is obliged to dredge all qanats and carry 
away debris so that once more it doesn’t destroy or block the pool and qanat. If torrent floods 
threaten the qanat, a detouring blockage will be made by use of local instruments such as wood 
and jaz (a local term denoting dense and round plants such as Astragalus, Artemisia, etc.) and 
the Kahkin is in charge of pouring extra loam on the jaz to ameliorate flood risk. This extra 
loam extracted from the Qanat, along with wood and jaz, and collectively these material act as 
a firm blockage which protects the Qanats and pools against being washed away.  
 
8 Photographs of the water pool, Mazo stone and Lapoo are shown in online supplementary material 1.   
Another local custom is the banning of tree-planting around the Qanat channel. Farmers believe 
that plants’ root will penetrate to the underground water table and subsequently deviate the 
Qanat’s water flow and augment the annual dredging process. As one participant stated:  
“If someone wants to use the water in the Qanats’ channel and plant tree near it, 
Kadkhoda will stop him, because this will destroy the channel and also if there is a 
need to change the size of the channel due to the increase in the diameter of the Qanat, 
it will not be possible”.  
However, around the Qanat’s outlet i.e. several meters away, short or shallow rooted trees such 
as thorny olive and poplar are permitted to be planted. If the Qanat’s channels are arranged so 
that the mother well is located in one village, but its outlet is in other village, those who live in 
the village hosting the mother well are not allowed to plant any trees within its boundaries. If 
dispute over this issue arises between two villages, the Kadkhoda specifies a 70m distance limit 
around the Qanat’s channel. Hence, if a farmer’s land is situated within this limit, he will be 
only allowed to plant agricultural crops, not trees, and will be denied permission to dig a well 
or Qanat there.  
In villages where there is either one river with various tributaries, a river that passes through 
several villages, a water resource that is supplied by snow-melt, or originates from different 
springs in different villages, then a special customary system is formed in this area for water 
consumption. In this system, a detouring pass from the river goes to the gardens. This detouring 
pass is locally called Bon Au Doun (made of wood) as one respondent stated:  
“Using stone and concrete for construction is prohibited because it will rob downside 
villages from their water right due to the impenetrability of concrete structures.”  
The water flowing in this bypass must be “more than a brook”. The size of the Bon Au Doun 
differs based upon its distance from the source. Bon Au Doun located between the near villages 
Khafku and Khardun must be designed to divide water equally. However, the Bon Au Doun of 
Bagh Hanti village, which is located further from downside villages, can potentially deviate 
total river water. This is because consumed water in upside villages is drained and returns to 
the riverbed. So, villages near to the river enjoy more water access rights than downside ones. 
However, because the applied structure for detouring water is wooden (and hence porous), 
some water always remains within the river. Therefore, the water rights of other villages will 
be observed. If concrete material is used in constructing the Bon Au Doun, then this creates 
social tension between villages. Each village is can set just one Bon Au Doun. Arbabs, who 
have livestock, have to send their cattle to the pasture and are not allowed to use the pool or 
qanat’s outlet water. That’s because herds enter the pool and destroy the Qanat’s outlet. If this 
happens, the Arbab will have to pay more in dredging costs.  
IK-based agricultural management also incorporated local customs for fruit-picking. During 
walnut harvesting, owners of smaller lands can’t begin harvesting sooner than the optimal 
season because, Pak-chins9 will encroach onto bigger gardens. The harvest also can’t start at 
different times in different parts of the village. This is done so that group security of all gardens 
can be guaranteed10. This action is “bottom-up” in the sense that help is coordinated by the 
farmers themselves rather than a centralized authority. However, cooperation is socially 
mandatory, and ecological knowledge plays an important role in the picking of fruit. This IK 
of harvesting helps the community to identify socially-optimal harvest times. Locals believe 
 
9 Roozkin gardeners leave some fruit on the trees so that so-called Pak-chins can somehow enjoy God’s blessing. 
10 Photos of the village gardens can be found in online supplementary material 1.  
when the green shell of walnut is cracked, it is its harvest time and it will easily come off the 
branch. If its shell is not cracked and it is picked up in time, its kernel will turn black. 
Community members therefore share labour time to break the walnuts and remove the kernels 
due to the perceived time-sensitive nature of the harvesting process. 
Another common custom in the villages of Sarduyeh municipality is cooperation during 
planting and harvesting agricultural crops (including wheat). Notably, villagers are quick to 
help one another during harvest time. If an Arbab’s garden fruits ripen early, he asks other 
villagers for help and one person from each family obliges. In turn, the Arbab is also committed 
to help them harvesting their products. This action could be described as bilateral 
compensatory mutual assistance – a type of cooperation through collective action that increases 
compliance with common pool resource management, collaboration and social altruism within 
the village to maintain a stock of social capital amongst the agricultural workers under 
conditions of uncertain harvesting. We see therefore, that the customs around both engineered 
structures and their materials, land and water ownership, river-based irrigation measures, 
grazing herd and management practices, and labour-division during harvest collectively 
constitute a holistic IK-based water and agricultural management system that maintains the 
sustainability of the resource within the whole watershed basin. 
 
Cultural beliefs amongst Roozkin Village farmers 
Close contact with ecological systems has inscribed specific beliefs and attitudes within the 
social practices of the villages within this region. Some specific features can be summarized as 
follows. For example, people in the area commonly believe that cutting a green tree is the same 
as the killing of a child. This is rooted in the religious beliefs of the people of the region to the 
extent that planting a tree is, in essence, a form of worship. The tree is symbolic of life, the 
seasonal-biological changes such as budding and fruiting act as social markers for times of the 
year, and for different social customs. In the very first year that fruits are picked, they are not 
sold but donated to the poor or to those who have no fruit trees of their own. Within local 
custom this is believed to enhance future crop yields and to protect their trees against harm. In 
late summer, as walnut and other fruits are harvested, each farmer bestows some fruit to those 
who come over to their garden. Roozkin gardeners leave some fruit on the trees as so-called 
Pak-chins which will incur God’s blessing. When there is drought, people gather together and 
get to say a “Rain Prayer”. They will also slaughter sheep in religious sacrifice so that God will 
enrich their future harvest and raise the qanats’ water. As one respondent explained: 
“In order to increase the flow of qanats and increase in products and for God’s sake 
we should slaughter a sheep.”  
All Arbabs attend this type of thanksgiving ceremony at the end of autumn once the harvest is 
collected. Also, one land-owner stated: 
“The cloud which comes from the Qibla11 side is believed to be a rain cloud and will 
bring us merciful rain”. 
This belief has its antecedents in Iran’s complex atmospheric geography. Iran is located within 
an arid belt, but close to tropical ocean systems. The patterns of the rainwater systems 
originating from the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf are vital to the region. Summer rainfall 
 
11 The Qibla, also transliterated as Qiblah, Kiblah, Kıble or Kibla, is the direction that should be faced when a 
Muslim prays during Salah. It is fixed as the direction of the Kaaba in Mecca. 
is very effective in boosting agriculture and re-supplying water behind dams, and its 
containment can evolve in the pattern of cultivation and livelihood of the residents of the 
region. As in many indigenous cultures, worship practices and offerings are designed to 
stimulate a perceived supernatural influence over unpredictable climatic systems. The 
villagers’ wellbeing and economic prosperity is deeply intertwined with the amount of water 
available for agriculture within the arid region, so social practices of water management are 
geared towards trying to maximize the total stock of available water through worship and 
sacrifice. Such actions are designed to minimize the structural vulnerability that villagers face 
in relation to arid conditions, unpredictable weather systems and the inherent threat of long-
term climatic variability affecting the region.  
Discussion 
This study examines local-based initiatives and indigenous knowledge of water resource 
management in the Jiroft County. Local traditions play a key role in the management of 
irrigation, water storage, and sustainable agriculture in the region. Local people, despite their 
ongoing economic marginalization under conditions of environmental stress from growing 
drought conditions, have rich social capacities to achieve sustainable management of local and 
regional water resources, which in turn, strengthen their adaptive capacity in the face of water 
scarcity. Emphasizing the complexity of social structures within the settlements of the region 
and resilience to other climate-related disasters such as floods, the inhabitants have long been 
securing and protecting local water management and sharing initiatives whilst still respecting 
and accepting culturally defined, water-related traditions, ownership models and hierarchies 
amongst the local people. 
Inhabitants of the Jiroft County region collectively focus upon the importance of harmony 
between human economic and social capital – commonly termed ecosystem services. By 
creating local traditions in the conservation of water resources such as reduced well drilling at 
certain intervals from the boundaries of the Qanats, and the unique laws of lower river 
delineation (for example using water based on each Habe), they have been able to split the 
water supply system through small-scale units like Shahi and Ghayah with local people. In 
spite of recent population growth, water resources remain well managed as a common pool 
resource because water access rights remain fairly divided between properties, and between 
villages. We can therefore interpret this system of indigenous water management as an adapted 
spontaneous common-pool resource management framework (Ostrom 1990). That is, that the 
water management systems differentiate rules between stock capital of stored water in pools 
and flow capital of the Qanat. This shows similarity to other indigenous knowledge-based 
water management systems, such as those in cases in Eritrea (Mehari, Schultz, and Depeweg 
2005), Australia (Keremane, McKay, and Narayanamoorthy 2006), or Ecuador (Adolina 
2012), that use systems of geographically distributed and hierarchically-defined systems of 
rules for water ownership based upon proximity to upstream and downstream river use. The 
systems in place in Roozkin have clearly defined boundaries, governed hierarchically based 
upon a culturally-embedded system of land ownership that is used to separate water rights 
according to quantity and time of access to the water resource. By having a system of culturally-
ascribed rights in place, collective payments for maintenance operations (such as well digging 
or dredging) there is congruence between the water appropriation and provision rules based 
upon local conditions and ownership structures. The hierarchical system provides effective 
monitoring of the total water stock (and accountability between water appropriators and those 
that monitor water usage) and sanctions for those that do not respect the rules (i.e. exclusion of 
access to the resource).  
Indigenous knowledge of the division and management of water as a precious resource in 
different parts of the world has considerable value for adapting centralized, top-down systems 
of water management under conditions of climate stress. People in the studied region have 
mechanisms and social capacities for collecting, managing and storing rural water resources. 
It is notable that villages such as Roozkin perform effective water management at considerably 
lower cost than the large centrally-planned initiatives common to other parts of the country, 
and to other countries that prioritise grey-infrastructure systems. The reasons for this are 
twofold. First, Roozkin relies upon a hierarchically-defined water ownership model that links 
together levels of social management responsibility with defined water orbit – such that those 
with greater levels of power and responsibility within the social hierarchy have greater access 
and thus greater economic benefit. However, those with the greatest share are also responsible 
for managing the resource governance structure: resolving conflicts within the village and 
ensuring rule-adherence so that the common pool resource is maintained. Second, the village 
adopts codified norms of social cooperation, social capital resource-sharing, and 
environmentally flexible practices that are profit-generating to the point that surpluses of 
agricultural goods are used to finance the poorest famers within the village. Moreover, the 
poorest and those just on the margin of profit are often exempted from paying contributions for 
water management projects. For example, when the qanat is dredged, the majority of Zaeims 
of the region are often chosen from the lowest-income people in order to help them to become 
financially self-sufficient. In terms of climate adaptation planning, the sharing of both the 
financial and common pool resource risks across these social hierarchies improves the social 
resilience of the affected community because systems of water-sharing and labour-division 
become increasingly egalitarian under conditions of growing resource scarcity.  
The water management system has potentially negative socio-cultural impacts such as the 
development of socially-homogeneous groups and the maintenance of a familial elite. With 
broader changes in land use policy and planning in Iran and the loss of traditional livelihoods 
in regions like Jiroft, intra-group stakeholder conflicts are a constant risk, and this is 
exacerbated by the entrance of new technology implemented from ‘outside’ e.g. government 
involvement in centralized water distribution control, modern irrigation and grey infrastructure 
drainage networks. By analyzing the social organization that emerged from Demn irrigation 
system, it can be concluded that indigenous knowledge has led to continued social survival 
under difficult environmental conditions through the collective action and involvement of local 
people as water management stakeholders in problem resolution. The people of these areas 
have been able to make sustainable livelihoods for centuries using techniques and constructs 
such as Lapoo, Mazo, Qanat and the water pool; we argue therefore that the political threat of 
centralised water management is significant - it reduces the community’s capacity to negotiate 
internally to manage their scarce resource effectively – and this is a greater threat to the 
sustainability of their livelihoods than just climate-related water scarcity alone.  
 
Conclusions 
Our findings support the argument that a hydro-social paradigmatic shift towards adaptive 
water resource planning is beneficial in terms of socio-environmental development and cost 
efficiency when compared to newer ‘hard infrastructure’ solutions that favour centralized, grey 
infrastructure, policy-driven and technocratic water management mechanisms (Nabavi 2018, 
Jalal Mirnezami, Bagheri, and Maleki 2018). In fact, the concepts of ownership experience, 
cost recovery, enforcement, equity, integrity, and unity, which are highly pronounced in 
centralized systems, can also be found in the traditional water management of the studied 
region. Based upon our observational and interview findings, the issue of ownership is one of 
the main factors that influences success of failure of such schemes. Sense of ownership is a 
challenge for centralized water management systems. Often the users are not integrated to 
protect and run their own water supply system. Nevertheless, when it comes to centralised 
water management, it quickly becomes incompatible with local customs and practices - 
communities become passive observers or consumers, rather than active stakeholders, thus 
breaking the hydro-social cycle. Centralised systems are often subject to ineffective operation 
and maintenance; poor community representation and motivation, and user communities feel 
that water service production and maintenance become dependent upon external agents. 
Traditional water resource management, by contrast, has the capacity to establish shared sense 
of ownership, equitable distribution, consistent system operation and maintenance and cost 
recovery. The communities are already involved in the implementation and maintenance of 
their systems by providing cattle, contributing labour, and other possible options in the area. 
Therefore, users have common-but-differentiated responsibilities dependent upon their 
proportionate water consumption. 
Developing countries such as Iran have populations with diverse religious, cultural, social class 
and educational background.  Despite their heterogeneity and high population, external agents 
that assist in development are few compared with the number of service seekers. However, 
communities have their own traditional administrative systems where members respect and 
protect their communal resources. Typically, people are loyal to their own customary laws, and 
therefore, are commonly distrustful of externally-applied governance systems. Bringing a 
community from  traditional to centralized systems of management is therefore costly and 
difficult (Cleaver 2017), as it takes considerable time, finance and social license-building 
amongst community groups and external organizations. This is fundamentally an ineffective 
solution to chronic water supply problems under conditions of climate change that require 
urgent remedial action to ensure long-term resource sustainability. Therefore, working with, 
rather than against indigenous knowledge and traditional social hierarchies is necessary to 
create adaptive water management systems that will facilitate service-coverage in rural 
development. 
Though true on the village-scale, many urgent water management challenges cannot be met by 
existing traditional systems alone – scaling up the water management practices of local 
initiatives to larger regions, involving industrial (e.g. petrochemical) and agribusiness sectors 
requires innovation in irrigation technology and water management under increasingly arid 
conditions. However, we argue that it behoves policy-makers to better identify and integrate 
traditional science and knowledge with modern irrigation and water distribution technology. 
Efforts to build collaborative partnerships are necessary but not sufficient conditions and may 
be forestalled if governments fail to acknowledge the claims of indigenous peoples to have a 
meaningful say in water management. In this respect, Ross et al. (2016) and McGregor (2014) 
argue that a lack of recognition of indigenous knowledge is one of the obstacles to the 
participation of local people in NRM. Berkes (2012) also contends that the prioritisation of 
techno-centric approaches may result in the rejection of IK by water managers. Local 
knowledge is often considered by government agents to be superstitious, irrelevant or simply 
a hindrance to the goal of modernising resource management policy. Moreover, urban 
government officials often have no, or very limited, understanding about local rules and 
customs within rural communities. They therefore often assume that local knowledge is, at 
best, outdated. We would argue, based on the research presented here, that the lack of formal 
recognition of the value of IK is both detrimental to the ecosystem services of water-scarce 
regions and to the rights and procedural justice afforded to indigenous people. 
Indigenous peoples commonly recognize a need to gain technical knowledge and thus 
contribute to water management led by techno-centric authorities, but they also want to see 
two-way knowledge-sharing, where water management authorities also learn about local 
traditions (Stevenson 2006). This runs counter to common science communication practice 
which posit knowledge-sharing as one-way knowledge-transfer from techno-scientific 
authorities to local ‘lay’ actors. As a vehicle for bringing parties together, sharing knowledge, 
building understanding towards convergence of goals and enabling deliberation in the co-
management of water (Collins and Ison 2010), agreement-making appears to be a mechanism 
that local peoples trust and from which positive outcomes can emerge; for example new norms 
of water use and decision-making criteria. Thus, a two-way knowledge exchange and 
partnership working between local people and techno-scientific authorities can be implemented 
through formal mechanisms of water regulation and management. By offering a structure for 
focusing on the procedural rules that allow meaningful deliberation to take place (Schmidt 
2014), such agreements should offer parties at all levels of the water management sector—
policy, administrative, research, management and practitioners—the opportunity to negotiate 
a socially legitimate and environmentally sustainable solution. By learning from the 
experiences of combined top-down and collective action for water sharing at the local scale, a 
broader collective agreement could serve as a framework for ensuring the inclusion of 
indigenous people.  
Finally, although we recognize that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the incorporation of 
IK in water management, we argue that broader adoption of elements of the Jiroft county model 
could help to structure good water management and environmental sustainability through 
effective common pool resource management. The beneficial elements are as follows. Firstly, 
no individual can take more than their fair share of water, through twin processes. The first is 
‘top-down’ based upon institutional norms of social obedience to a hierarchical system of water 
management, and the second is ‘bottom-up’: through collective action to ensure economic self-
sufficiency and profitability through self-organized labour division between farmers. The IK 
around water management practices also furthers social sustainability aims by reducing conflict 
risks that would emerge under common pool resource depletion under conditions of scarcity. 
As water resources become less predictable under land use and climate change conditions over 
time (Berkes and Turner 2006), the social systems of water management through IK in this 
case, provide greater resilience and reduce the risk of social shocks from resource depletion 
(both within and between villages) (Shava et al. 2010) when compared to remote, centralized 
systems of water control based upon grey infrastructure, private enterprise and utility 
regulation. In essence, the establishment of water ownership through twin hierarchies of water 
orbit and management responsibility, a system of established social norms to rule adherence, 
and bilateral compensatory mutual assistance through surplus labour and agricultural stock 
sharing, provide a management system that would improve the adaptive capacity of small rural 
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Supplementary material 1. 
 
The following photographs are taken from the field site. Photo copyright rests with the authors. 













































4. Shows the water flowing out of the Mazo: 
 
   
5. Shows the Zaeim unclogging the Mazo stone. 
 
  
6. Shows an overview of the village gardens 
 
 
 
